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Abstract 
 
An in-depth study of the practises within the maritime oil industry was undertaken to ascertain safety 
issues in seafaring vessels. It was more concentrated on the type of accidents that occur in machine 
spaces of seafaring vessels in this industry. The main focus of the research was streamlined to fire in 
machinery spaces. The literature review later concentrated on two of such incidences, they are oil 
spill and fire events. An investigation was done to assess those factors which actually contribute or 
are in association to fire outbreak. A content analysis methodology was used to investigate the 
associative relationships to fire outbreak with the aid of NVivo 9.0 software. The investigation 
focused on 15 key in-depth reports on machinery space incidences which were uploaded into the 
software. The results indicate that leakages on hot surfaces were the major causes of fire hazards in 
seafaring vessels. The results from using this methodology also highlighted two more fire hazards 
that were not so apparent in previous studies. They are generator fire and compressors fire. The 
results supported other studies about leakages on hot surfaces as a major contributor, but also clearly 
show that there are other hazardous factors of fire in machinery spaces that require further 
investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1.0 Introduction 
The study seeks to understand health and safety issues in the workplace in relation to causes of fire 
outbreak in machinery spaces of seafaring going vessels. The investigation is based on those that 
contribute or are in association to fire events on sea vessels. This has been recognized due to 
continuous technological changes and advancement with regards to vessel design, and complex 
machinery space configuration. Vessels are seen to be exposed to high risk level of hazards such as 
fire outbreak and explosion which can further lead to fatality, vessel destruction and environmental 
pollution. These issues have prompted the need for continuous research into such hazards that can be 
encountered on sea vessels used for the transportation of oil products. 
Lu and Tsai (2008) explain that the environmental conditions of the sea ranks the highest of all 
hazards with respect to assessment of risks to cases of vessel and cargo loss or damage, injuries and 
fatalities. According to IMO (2006), the sea has been recognised as a potential and hazardous 
occupation. In the area of oil spill, Hong et al (2010) writes that due to the fast development in 
maritime industry with respect to vessels that engage in shipping of oil derivatives, oil spill has 
become of significance importance. This according to the authors is of major human concern which 
poses a major threat to the ecosystem. Regulations that have been put in place have aided in making 
sure that most vessels are built in view of safety and constructed to minimise the level of oil spill 
incidences when accidents occur (Psarros et al, 2011). 
The aspect of fire hazard is the main focus of this paper, with specific reference to machinery spaces. 
Fire event occur most times as a result of little detail going wrong (DNV, 2007). They further imply 
that it is difficult avoiding its occurrence in the absences of comprehensive data and lack of 
experience on tackling such incidences. The avoidance of these occurrences involves practises 
directed to safety which embraces regulations and maritime industry recommendations (IMCA, 
2003). Evegren (2010) indicates that in the past, most maritime regulations are often initiated 
reactively after a problem has occurred. This implies that the decisions forming the regulations have 
been reactive instead of proactive. In view of these problems, the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) 
Methodology (Ventikos and Psaraftis, 2004) was developed. The method was initiated by the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) as a body that holds the responsibility directed to 
maritime welfare worldwide. The main idea of the FSA is more focused on reducing uncertainties to 
“as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP), but does not infer that the chances of risk has been 
reduced (Trbojevic, 2000). However, for the FSA to reduce risk to ALARP, it will adopt techniques 
that can identify hazards, assess risk, measure cost benefit and make proficient decisions (Wang, 
2002). The ALARP principle according to Rosqvist and Tuomien (2004) is the most accepted 
decision rule in risk informed decision making. Its effect basically leads to a more focused approach 
to precaution (Trbojevic, 2000). Furthermore, the author indicates that taking precaution in itself 
reduces risk. Kontovas (2005) writes that the need for risk identification and analysis tools is for 
tackling risk issues, which ensures a more informed decision making with regards to dwelling on 
incidences experienced in the past and making the whole process more proactive. Once the hazards 
has been prioritise, one can then safely carry out the full SFA.  
This is achieved by using a content analysis qualitative method in place of scientific methods to 
assess fire incident reports in vessels in other to derive the desired samples for investigation. The 
methodology according to Lee and Kim (2001) is used for making inferences from secondary data in 
a systematic, qualitative and objective manner in other to evaluate variables that are of interest. The 
qualitative content analysis normally relies on software programs like NVivo 9.0 which will assist in 
organising, managing and coding the incidents reports in a more proficient manner (Zhang and 
Wildemuth, 2009). Further analysis will be done using graphical solutions to understand the 
relationships of the discovered hazards to fire.  
The rest of the paper is the literature review on health and safety in the maritime industry within 
seafaring vessels, and establishing the gap that exist in the identification of  hazards for a FSA 
analysis; the methodology chosen to carry out the study; the results obtained from the study and the 
discussion and conclusion.  
 
2.0 Safety Practises in the Maritime arm of the Oil and Gas Sector. 
Oil operations are divided into three main groups namely, the „upstream‟ (oil exploration, drilling 
and extraction), refining and transportation phase (Alemagi, 2007). The initial stage involves 
practises such as remote sensing alongside satellite mapping techniques which has seismic techniques 
used for the identification of potential oil reserves. The second stage is the refining of crude to 
produce commercial products such as gasoline and other oil derivatives PetroStrategies, 2000). The 
transportation stage is the main focus of the research, in regards to fire hazards that can be 
encountered in the shipping of oil and gas. The IMO observes that operations in this area are 
regarded as one of the most dangerous sectors when compared with other big industries (Alemagi, 
2007). Furthermore, it is advisable that key stakeholders in the maritime transportation industry need 
to improve the health and safety culture within individual organizations (Celik, 2009). This is further 
seen in reports which show serious injuries and drowning amongst personnel in the seafaring 
operations ranging from 11.5 to 278 times more than the average fatality rates amongst the general 
workforce ashore (Havold, 2010). Knudsen and Hassler (2011) states that there are three unarguable 
facts that relates to safety and environment protection in world shipping, 
 Vast reduction in the amount of marine accidents worldwide for several decades now, 
 Adoption of new conventions by the IMO to regulate marine traffic as well as making sure 
that these new conventions are well implemented, 
 Deficiency in the implementation of IMO regulations due to unreliable data which has led to 
differences in the findings (i.e. data for shipping accidents) 
Bejan (2010) believes that even with a well-developed framework with regards to international 
standards of safety at sea and maritime environmental protection, several owners and countries still 
indulge in breaking the rules even though this framework exists within the IMO and International 
Labour Organization (ILO). Such negligence often times endangers the lives of crew members and 
the environment while considering only their own benefits. Trbojevic and Carr (2000) in a research 
undertaken, observed that a proposal was made by the United Kingdom Marine Safety Agency 
(MSA) to the IMO in relation to the application of the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)which could 
be applied to ensure that certain strategies are put in place for safety and pollution prevention. The 
FSA has been explained as a way of identifying risks, analysing these risks and looking at how best 
such risk could be managed in a cost-effective manner. In order to facilitate the decision making 
process of the IMO, with regards to new regulations for the shipping industry, this methodology was 
created (Wang, 2001). The author further explains that the method is valuable when optimising risks 
of hazards to as low as reasonably practicable. Ventikos and Psaraftis (2004) from their view under 
the IMO regulations indicates that the process of the FSA commences with describing the issues to 
be investigated, putting into consideration the limitations and reasons for such constraints. The 
implementation should be in line with contemporary requirements and with the presence of good 
knowledge of operation while considering all the aspects like on-board systems/ functions, ships and 
accident categories when implementing. The FSA consists of the following steps; 
 Identification of hazards, 
 Risk Assessment, 
 Risk control options, 
 Cost benefit assessment and 
 Recommendation for Decision Making. 
The application of the process has to be highlighted in such a way that it will reflect issues like vessel 
type, the hazard category of the vessel being investigated so as to integrate all necessary aspects in 
the study. A unique model should be adopted which explores collective systems in the nature of 
management; organisational structure, human competence, hardware and electronic aspects so as to 
recognise their importance and not be used for analysis focused on individual vessel or procedure 
alone. However, in the case of human error, Soares and Teixeira (2001) advices for an orderly 
treatment of the FSA as foreseen that human element is one of the major contributor to the causes 
and avoidances of accidents which the FSA identifies. They further explain that a comprehensive 
data which involves cases of operational failure, incidence reports, and near misses is needed for 
making more accurate, cost saving and practical decisions. Wang (2001) notes that the IMO 
ceaselessly continues to solve issues which are related to operations, survey, management and 
responsibilities of the governing body itself. However, the author indicates that for these problems to 
be reduced there will be a need to embrace the FSA which may; 
 Offer a system for protecting and regulating events that could lead to unplanned occurrences, 
 Endeavour that in recent ships, performance is improved and the experience gathered from 
previous incidences are unified into making efficient decisions for future progress, 
 Continuous improvement on recent ships so as to measure the change between new and old 
fleets based in relation to design.  
2.1 Safety on Vessel with Regards to Oil Spill 
A study by Vanem et al (2008) of oil and chemical spills in US waters between 1980 and 2001 leads 
to the conclusions that, oil spill has a greater number of occurrences compared to chemical and other 
related spills for shipping activities.The total cost of recovering such incidence comes in two 
classifications. Psarros et al (2011) explains this further by pointing out the initial as environmental 
damage as a result of dilapidation of the natural resources which leads to a drop in their services/ the 
cost of control measures of removing the oil e.g. (personnel and equipments). The second instance 
according to the author is focused more on the losses and damages related to money and property of 
stakeholders of those in tourism and fisheries which adds to claims on a third party level in an 
acceptable scheme for compensation. Kirby and Law (2010) mentions that more focused scientific 
and technological development is aimed at finding solutions to preventing the effects of ship spills, 
outlining options for treatment as using chemical oil dispersants, bioremediation products, sorbents 
and manual recovery (Kirby and Law, 2008), stating that using controls measures like chemical oil 
dispersant can have a positive influence to the health of the practitioner and the ecosystem (Lessard 
and Demarco, 2000).From a different point of view, Ventikos et al (2004) suggest an acceptable 
approach for avoiding oil spill as prevention in itself. Further implying that facing the outcome of 
such consequences won‟t be an option compared to avoiding a polluting incident or accident which is 
safer. Alternative technologies that can be used to prevent oil spill according to Dalton and Jin (2010) 
is the adoption of a double hull vessels which has been seen as a way of reducing the severity and 
being efficient in avoiding large spills which has been in comparison with a single hull vessel.This 
new design of ships was not acceptable to some ship owners like the Greek, who from their view 
explain that the design of double hull is not a solution for pollution avoidance and safety compliance 
(Goulielmos, 2001). According to stakeholder from Greek, British and Dutch diplomats, Thebault 
(2004) writes that a shortage of oil supply to demand might erupt because of reduced number of 
supply vessels which are of double hull specification since single hull vessels are to be phased 
out.This is based on the speculation of the rate at which the phased out single hull vessels will be 
replaced with the new specification considering their tonnage. The strategy for the approach of 
double hull according to Wang (2006) or mid-deck structural requirement for recent vessels came 
into legislature after the incidence of Exxon Valdez which occurred in 1989 causing a lot of damage. 
 
 
2.2 Safety on Vessels with Regards to Fire 
Fire that is activated by any likely ignition sources like open flames, sparks, leakage and other known 
sources, which  can be as a result of oil spill or flammable materials (Pulaet al, 2006).The guiding 
rules for fire protection on vessels have been adjusted very often in the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) regulations which is contained in chapter II-2 of SOLAS convention (Lois, 2004). A safety 
assessment had been carried out in order to make safety requirements more redefined, simple and 
contemporary for new ships which have led to a comprehensive revision of such regulations. The 
International Marine Contractors Association IMCA (2003) in an article explains that “machinery 
spaces are, by their very nature, the most susceptible of all shipboard compartments to serious 
fires”, which is the major area of concentration for this study. Comparison has shown that two third 
of fire breakouts starts from the engine room which is situated in the machinery spaces of vessels Det 
Norske VeritasDNV (2007).In addition to this, they write that 56% involvement of all fire breakouts 
in engine rooms excluding cases of ship repairs were ignited by leakages of oil onto hot surfaces. 
Ships could be crippled or destroyed by the exposure of hot oil which can arise as a result of diesel 
fuel, lubricating oil, hydraulic oil spills Cote (2003).DNV (2007) indicates that associated cost of 
engine room fire can be equated to between 1 to 4 million USD for cargo vessels compared to 
passenger ships including the cost of off-hire and loss of image which are summed up in the amount 
and are irreplaceable. They further gave a statistics of causes within a ship that can erupt fire which 
are hazards for crew members on duty in such places and also fire fighters as represented below with 
oil leakage having the highest propensity to cause such outbreak. 
 Causes of Fire (Source: DNV, 2007). 
 
Set-off actions for unforeseen incidences are common around human error aspects in vessels 
(Evegren, 2010). IMO (2002) defines it as “a departure from acceptable or desirable practice on the 
part of an individual or a group of individuals that can result in unacceptable or undesirable results”. 
Authors like Rothblum (2002) describes human errors from a different angle, suggesting it can be as 
a result of a wrong decision, inappropriate executed task or inappropriate/ uncompleted action. 
Mitigation processes for such unplanned incidences from Atherton (2000) view is a well-planned/ 
operative extinguishing and fire detection system, side by side with a thoroughly trained crew which 
will balance the designed fire mitigation and operating measures in fire circulation reduction that 
will basically cut down the damage to properties and harm to life when fire ignites. 
2.3 Hazards on Ships 
 
The IMO (2007) has listed some hazards that are potential sources of ignition on vessels which can 
lead to fire outbreak. As the study focuses on machinery spaces of vessels, a list of factors that are 
susceptible to ignition has to be considered in the work of Evegren (2010) and IMO (2007) to 
estimate the risk of fire that occur in this particular compartment. This are; 
 General: Hazards that can lead to fire: Friction, hot surface, radio waves, naked flame, electric 
arc, incendiary spark. 
 Deck areas: Events that can create hazards: Deck lighting, hot work sparking, funnel exhaust 
emissions. 
 Accommodation space: Factors that can lead trigger events: Laundry facilities e.g., washing 
machines, tumble driers, irons etc. Electronic navigational devices. 
 Machinery spaces: Equipments which are susceptible to fire hazards: Generator engine 
exhaust manifold, air compressor units. 
 
2.3.1 Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis Techniques 
 
There are different techniques for identifying risk in vessels in relation to hazards. They are;  
 What-if-analysis - The methodology HSE (2000) can be used to assess any part of a process 
by engaging in brainstorming. The number of participants increases depending on the size of 
task. One criterion for this method is that it uses experienced examiners that can detect 
hazards which when omitted, could lead to an inadequate evaluation. 
 Hazard and operability - HSE (2005) defines it to be a process hazard identification. HAZOP 
is used for assessing potential hazards from failure in a process and at the same time identify 
them. It deals more on the hazards caused by nonconformity of normal operating conditions. 
 Failure Mode and effects Analysis (FMEA) - Webb and Lamoureux (2003) describe FMEA 
as an inductive approach used for re-examining a part of an overall system which is the 
physical sub-system component. Its main need is for assessing mechanical and electrical 
devices like fire suppression devices. 
 Fault Tree Analysis - HSE (2000) summarizes FTA as a combination of faults that can lead to 
an unwanted event. The development of an FTA according to Kontovas (2005) adopts a top to 
bottom style, putting into consideration the causes of the events under the top level or maybe 
two or move events need to transpire to affect the next scenario. This is normally explained 
using the fault logic and logic gate. 
 Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) – this is dealt with in detail in the next section 
2.3.2 Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) 
The formal safety assessment is a methodology normally used and may be the most appropriate 
assessment technique in the maritime industry for optimizing risk to ALARP. Hu et al (2007) 
explains that the methodology has a more validated approach compared to the traditional approach of 
decision making which the latter is more of “regulation by disaster”.The methodology of this 
guideline has a 5 step process as listed earlier which the IMO (2007) has explained that, the generic 
model will have to consider the collection of systems which will include management, operational, 
human, organizational, electronically and hardware characteristics to fulfill the defined functions and 
not to be viewed as a single entity (ship). 
Step 1 - Hazard Identification 
IMO (2007) indicates that the first step is focused on identifying hazards which/ when can take place, 
and ranking them according to their level of threat. By using standard practices, those that can engage 
in accidents can be screened and spotted out using data available and making objective decisions 
afterwards. Ventikos and Psaraftis (2004)writes that the HAZID stage uses a combination of both 
creative and analytical techniques giving examples as Human Risk Assessment (HRA), statistical 
analysis, expert judgement, etc. 
Step 2 - Risk Analysis 
Risk analysis focuses on the more important scenarios identified in the first step. IMO (2007) writes 
that it is based on investigating the causes and outcome of associated risks. This is done by using the 
best methods that will model those risks. It is believed that using these models, more attention will be 
focused on those risks with higher tendency so as to identify and evaluate those actions that makes 
them occur. 
Step 3 - Risk Control Options 
Wang (2002) writes that the target of RCO‟s is to minimize the occurrences or prevent chances of 
failures, and can be achieved using structural evaluation methods to identify existing control options 
for decision making which will reduce cost. IMO (2007) explains that existing risks created by new 
technology and updated methods of management and operation will have to be considered when 
creating risk control options. 
 
Step 4 - Cost Benefit Assessment (CBA) 
This stage concentrates on those costs that are needed to implement each Risk Control Options 
(RCO) mentioned in stage three. IMO (2007) guideline summarises it as focusing on identifying and 
comparing the benefits and costs of executing risks control options. The definition of cost according 
to IMO may include initial cost, operating, inspection, decommissioning, certification, training, etc. 
and should be expressed as life cycle cost when referring to costs, while injuries, environmental 
damages, reduction in fatalities, indemnity of third party etc. may include benefits and an 
enhancement in standard life of ships. 
Step 5 - Recommendations for Decision Making 
Recommendation at this stage is a critical review focused on comparing and aligning all the 
mentioned hazards with their causes. Wang (2002) indicates this step aims as making decisions and 
giving recommendations for safety improvement. The information generated can be used to assist in 
the choice of cost-effective and equitable changes and to select the best risk control option. 
The literature cites that there have been continuous lapses in the IMO conventions of which the 
governing body earnestly try to curb. Majority of them domicile on ship owners who do not adhere to 
the stipulated regulations, thereby creating gaps for the IMO on having a comprehensive data of 
those hazards that result to ship accidents e.g., fire.However, this can result to loss of life for crew 
members or image of any organization. Majority of this fire hazards investigated by different authors 
commences from the machinery space of vessels, because of the very nature of the compartment 
which makes it susceptible to such hazard.Furthermore, to reduce the probability of occurrence, 
different risk models have been used overtime until the new regulation of FSA came into practise. 
This has been seen to have a precise approach which considers past, present and future occurrences 
when making decisions. 
 
 
3.0 Methodology 
The paper seeks to find the most appropriate method/ design for investigating the major causes of fire 
in machinery spaces of vessels from incidence reports. Content analysis is seen as a more conducive 
methodology for this study because it tends to adopt a design which revisits existing data without 
having to be a participatory researcher in the field. However, it relies on secondary data which is used 
to build theory and evaluate information, unlike other research methods which depend on 
questionnaires or interviews (i.e. case study, ethnography).The deductive approach will be used 
because previous data is available and needs to be reassessed from a different view by a researcher 
(Catanzaro 1988). The system according to Krippendorff (2004) is what is known as from general to 
particular, explaining that they are logically conclusive. This approach according to (Polit and Beck, 
2004; Hsieh and Shannon, 2005) concentrates on more recent documents, reports or materials in 
general. However, the documents will be transcribed to create samples with the aid of computer 
software (NVivo 9.0), assigning keywords to categories to be investigated and coding them as a form 
of classification to indicate their level of severity. However, for the other methods, responses from 
respondents via interviews and questionnaire are the backbone for sample generation. 
 
3.1 Sampling Criteria 
The study involves a content analysis of a sample of 15 incidences at sea Reports which are more 
directed to fire hazards on vessels with particular references to machinery space. This will be 
evaluated using content analysis method to understand the different views in the maritime industry on 
the causes of fire in machinery spaces and which of these triggering actions has the highest number 
of references. It will focus more on general assessment of opinions related to the causes of such 
hazards (i.e. excluding human factors, foundering, injuries to crews and collision and grounding) and 
not directed to answering any research questions. 
 
3.2 Content Analysis of Machinery Space Fires 
Report of engine room/ machinery space fires were downloaded from the Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch (MAIB), (13), Marine Accident Investigation Section (MAIS), (1) and Strategy 
European Research Cooperation on Maritime Safety (SURSHIP), (1).This was  imported into NVivo 
software, version 9.0- Qualitative Solutions and Research (QSR) Pty. Ltd. NVivo is related to 
NUD*IST (Non-Numerical Unstructured Data Indexing, Search and Theorizing) and a package for 
qualitative software research (SAGE, 2011). It makes provision for coding and recovery of coded 
materials, searching and theorizing with the potential to annotate and edit materials. The keywords 
used for investigating this hazards should be related to fire or have the same meaning (Elo and 
Kyngas 2008). 
3.3 Coding Strategy 
 
Reference to causes of fire was coded into 7 categories which were assigned in their respective 
nodes. This was done by inserting the keywords into the search query and carefully analysing the 
context of each paragraph to originate those that contribute to fire hazard. However, each reference 
made was saved into their corresponding nodes, putting into consideration the number of sources in 
which they appear. 
Table 1: Reference to Machinery Space Hazards from Reports 
Hazards Sources References 
boilers 2 4 
component failures 9 41 
compressors 1 1 
electrical 5 8 
generators 3 4 
hot work 5 23 
leakages and hot surface 10 63 
 
4.0 Data Analysis and Discussion 
 
In other to make it clearer to understand, data presentations have been adopted using graphical 
solutions to analyse the sample results. The representation of the outcome of each hazard originated 
from reports is to have an understanding of the number of reports that have made reference to 
particular hazard cases as a source of ignition. In addition, another investigation was done to evaluate 
which of these hazards has the highest contribution to fire outbreak. 
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 The illustration above depicts the frequency of appearances for hazards discovered in the reports used 
for investigation. Each of these hazards is known to have an association or contribute to the causes of 
machinery space fires. Leakages and hot surfaces is seen to have appeared in 10 out of the total 15 
reports which can be equated to 29% of the overall data used for the investigation. Component 
failures covered 26% as the second highest issue deliberated on. This was also a major issue that was 
made reference to in 9 of the reports. However, both electrical incidences and hot works have 14% 
each, of which cases as ignition sources was made reference to in 5 of the reports used for 
assessment. Furthermore, boiler incidences, compressors and generators had coverages of 6%, 3% 
and 8% consecutively having in one way or the other contributed or associated to fire incidences. 
 
Hazard Association in Igniting Fire 
 
Causes of fire incidences in machinery spaces have been graded according on how susceptible they 
are to fire. This was based on the investigation taken which led to the realization of the results shown 
in the above diagram. Hot works as shown, has a 16% chance of igniting fires in engine rooms, 
which is of high risk compared to some other hazards. This is not as porous as component failure 
event which has a 28% chance, also with leakages and hot surfaces indicated as the major causes of 
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machinery fire incidences with 44%. The remaining hazards, though reference has been made to 
them as having little possibilities of causing fire, they still associate or contribute to such incidences 
one way or the other. 
The investigation results on compressor incidences as susceptible to fire were not too common. 
However, the finding shows that it has a minimum probability of 1% chance of causing fire which 
does not conclude that it is not to be taken seriously. Literatures such as DNV, (2007) have indicated 
no evidence of such occurrences or have been considered unimportant due to its minimal association 
to machinery space fire. For generators, 8% of the reports have made references to fire incidences 
caused by the mechanical device. This indicates that generators have a 3% chance of causing 
machinery space fires. It has been noted as high risk due to its nature. Boilers have been identified by 
DNV (2007) as susceptible to fire, which also contributes to 14% of machinery space fire.The 
research in its findings also revealed that 14% of the overall reports gave instances of electrical 
failure hazards. It is discovered to have 5% chance of igniting fire. Based on the analysis, it can be 
agreed that leakages and hot surfaces have the most potential to ignite fires. The paper also 
mentioned the presence of new hazards compared to researches done by DNV (2007) that should be 
put into consideration (i.e. Generators and Compressors) which overtime can have a high significance 
level in relation to resulting in machinery space fire. 
5.0 Conclusion 
The issue of fire and explosion has been the background of the study and has been identified that 
machinery space is an area were fire erupts due to the nature of its compartment. Fire is caused by 
substances or mechanical failures which the IMO has indicated. For reducing this event, it has been 
specified that SOLAS had revised its regulation a couple of times in the view of enhancing safety 
practise. Different stakeholders have taken on the study in machinery spaces and it was discovered 
that leakages of oil on hot surfaces has the highest potential of fires occurrences. To revisit this case, 
this study used a content analysis methodology. This was with the aid of Qualitative Research 
software QRS NVivo 9.0, which resulted in the same outcome. The interesting finding was that other 
hazards were seen to be having presence in the association or contribution to fire incidences. Such 
hazards were not indicated in other studies (i.e. generators and compressors). The discussion on these 
hazards identifies that in as much as they have a minimum presence in contributing to fire; its 
activities can as well lead to fire and explosion on the long-run. However, there is need to reduce 
such occurrences to as “low as reasonable practicable” or eliminate them according to the ALARP 
philosophy. Failures and uncertainties that can lead to machinery fires can be tackled using hazard 
identification and risk techniques and also proposing control options for reducing their likelihood. 
Further research is advised into the causes of machinery space fires due to the fact that this study has 
used a minimum number of reports for its investigation compared to the likes of DNV. The 
underlying reason is that leakages of oil on hot surfaces have been viewed from the direction of 
machinery spaces. Furthermore, it does not conclude that there is an absence of human elements to its 
causation and can be as a result of poor housekeeping. In addition, a more holistic approach can be 
adopted using quantitative technique to evaluate the impacts of fire hazards and by giving a more 
concise control options with the use of numerics. This can be achieved by involving a cost benefit 
assessment to understand the cost saving involved in preventing these risks from occurring compared 
to when they actually happen. Finally, it has been identified that a hazard can contribute to fire 
outbreak, there might be a need for further research on incidences were possibilities of different 
hazards (i.e. three or more) might contribute to such fire incidences. The study shows the 
effectiveness of using content analysis in exposing major contributors to fire hazards in machinery 
spaces. This small sample research showed that the use of content analysis is an effective technique 
for extracting information from health and safety reports and databases on a large scale.  
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